ABSTRACT The recent proliferation of sensor-equipped mobile phones, together with the intrinsic mobility of their users, has enabled mobile crowdsensing (MCS) to spring up. In a typical MCS system, the MCS platform recruits mobile phone users (workers) to perform the sensing tasks published by requesters. The requesters are interested in some urban events and are willing to pay for the sensing data returned by the workers. A lot of incentive mechanisms have been presented in the literature, in order to stimulate workers to participate into MCS campaigns or to maximize the social welfare. However, the community has not yet paid much attention to optimizing the platform profit, which is highly valued by the profitmaking MCS organizers. In this paper, we consider a realistic MCS scenario that depends on probabilistic collaboration among workers and has constrained capacity of platform; and we focus on the platform profit maximization (PPM) in this MCS scenario. The PPM problem is NP-hard, and the key challenge stems mainly from the non-monotonicity caused by the probabilistic collaboration and the quality-based payment of the requester. First, we propose two polynomial-time approximation algorithms for the PPM problem: MaxG and RandG. Our main effort is dedicated to design RandG, which involves a randomization policy of selecting workers in its greedy framework, aimed at pursuing chances of skipping over incompetent local optima. We also prove that RandG can achieve a constant approximation ratio in expectation. Second, we present algorithm RandCom for general PPM problems, which combines MaxG and RandG to struggle to make as high platform profit as possible. Finally, we conduct extensive simulation to evaluate our designs in terms of platform profit.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a new paradigm of urban-scale sensing, Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) involves a crowd of mobile users who carry smartphone equipped with a rich array of sensors, such as microphone, camera, accelerometer, GPS, barometer, and so on [1] , [2] . Different from the static wireless sensing infrastructure, MCS exploits the mobility and the on-phone sensors of massive mobile users to enable a broad range of urbanscale sensing applications [3] - [8] , such as traffic monitoring, environmental monitoring, and others. As shown in Fig. 1 , a typical MCS architecture consists of three major components: a platform, a set of requesters, and a set of mobile users (also known as workers). In an MCS campaign, each requester publishes a sensing task to the platform, in hope of acquiring the signals or events occurring in her regionof-interest. The platform recruits a proper subset of workers who could stay in requesters' regions-of-interest, and allocate the sensing tasks to the workers recruited. After collecting the raw sensing data from workers, the platform offers the requesters with aggregated data or relevant services [9] , [10] . In order to incentivize the MCS campaign, the requester needs to pay the platform if her sensing task is performed with some data quality guarantee; on the other hand, the platform also needs to pay the workers if they participate in the MCS campaign and return raw sensing data.
MCS is comparable in some respects to Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [11] . Being a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace platform, MTurk exploits the crowd intelligence from a great amount of individual computers (workers), and then, provides businesses (requesters) the customized services that requesters' computers alone cannot do. MTurk has been applied to missing person searches, social science FIGURE 1. Architecture of a typical MCS application for urban-scale sensing. Here, the dashed circle is the region-of-interest of requester, and the workers staying in a given region-of-interest could be recruited to perform the corresponding sensing task.
experiments, educational researches, and so on. For most of MCS or MTurk-like crowdsourcing applications, their platform is the central building block, which bridges the workers and the requesters. The platform not only manages the information about workers and requesters but performs complicated computation-intensive tasks for service provision. In reality, the platforms are usually started and operated, for the profit-making purpose, by the companies or organizations with powerful computing ability [12] . Different from requesters, who are mainly concerned about the utility of sensing data, the MCS organizers or operators are in bad need of a universal solution for earning as much money as possible. In a broader sense, the platform profit is an important design consideration in MCS systems. The profit of an MCS platform is basically the amount of the revenue from requesters minus the expenditures of recruiting workers. Intuitively, the more workers and requesters the MCS platform calls upon, the more profits it can make, because the charge of a worker is usually less than the bid of a requester. However, two practical issues facing the MCS campaign or its organizer make it quite difficult to achieve effective solutions for maximizing MCS platform profit.
First, one challenge lies in the data uncertainty and the probabilistic collaborations that come along with it. Data uncertainty is a common problem facing by MCS and MTurklike crowdsourcing, and it is more prominent in MCS [13] . In a real-life MCS campaign, the workers are often rendered probabilistic for a few reasons. Usually, the daily mobility of workers cannot (sometimes, should not) be controlled by the platform. So, some of them may not fully participate in the MCS campaign-moving out of requesters' regions-ofinterest before they are done with the sensing tasks allocated by the platform. In addition, the workers sometimes return unreliable sensing data because of their occasional failures in data uploading or mistakes in data acquisition. In practice, however, the reward willingly paid by requester depends on the quality of the sensing data provided by the platform [14] . Therefore, the MCS application often leverages probabilistic collaboration among workers [15] - [17] : the platform recruits multiple probabilistic workers to collaboratively perform a common sensing task, in hope of offering requester with higher-quality sensing data to earn more. For a given sensing task, recruiting more workers can surely yield data of higher quality and then, more profit. However, more workers apparently push up the operation cost of an MCS campaign. Therefore, such a probabilistic collaboration in MCS adds complexity to maximizing the platform profit.
Second, the computing ability of platform could bring a cap to the total earning in a single MCS campaign. The storage and processing units housed inside the platform are usually constrained in terms of capacity [9] , [18] , which must have an effect on the pursuit of platform profit. Often, the workers deliver sensing data to the platform via Internet or other networks. These connections are established and maintained by the platform and are definitely constrained by the bandwidth or other forms of network resources available to the platform. Besides, massive streams of real-time data might swarm into the platform because of the urban-scale nature of MCS; however, the platform cannot in short time receive, buffer, and process all of these data streams. Only a finite number of workers are allowed to be involved in a single MCS campaign, especially in one with an urgent deadline demanded by requester, and therefore, the platform can only provide limited data services to requesters. Such an intrinsic limitation in processing capacity inevitably has an influence on the platform profit maximization, and then needs to be taken into account.
In this paper, we focus on the platform profit maximization (abbreviated as PPM) problem in the MCS depending on probabilistic collaborations. The objective of the PPM problem is to determine a subset of workers such that the MCS organizer can earn as much money as possible. More specifically, the major contributions of our work include the following aspects.
can possibly make MaxG trapped by local optima so that MaxG is not sufficient by itself to achieve higher platform profit when the non-monotonicity exists in the PPM problem. Thus we propose algorithm RandG, into which we embed a randomization policy of selecting workers. RandG could outearn MaxG by opportunistically skipping over the local optima caused by the non-monotonicity. The strength of RandG is that it can achieve a competitiveness ratio of constant factor in expectation.
• We present algorithm RandCom, which combines MaxG and RandG. Even with the need of extra running time, RandCom is more effective to general MCS applications than MaxG or RandG is. We finally evaluate this study with extensive numeric experiments, and the experimental results demonstrate the performance of our designs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formally defines the PPM problem and proves its NP-hardness. Section III presents three algorithms for the PPM problem, theoretically analyzes the competitiveness of RandG, and extends our designs for practical account. Section IV evaluates the proposed algorithms. Section V briefly introduces the major works related to our study. Finally, Section VI makes a conclusion of this paper.
II. MODELS AND PROBLEM

A. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper we consider the MCS scenario where there are m workers and n requesters registered to the MCS platform, and each requester publishes one task to the platform. We denote by W and T the set of workers and the set of sensing tasks published by requesters, respectively. In reality, it is possible that a worker only can perform part of the sensing tasks, instead of all of them. For instance, a worker will never move into the sensing area of some task during the whole MCS campaign, or her smartphone has no on-board sensors that can capture the environmental signals needed by that task. We denote by T i ⊆ T the set of tasks that worker w i can perform, and by W j ⊆ W, the set of workers who can perform task t j . We assume that once worker w i participates in the MCS campaign, she will perform all the tasks in T i , even possibly providing different data qualities to different sensing tasks.
The requester publishing task t j ∈ T submits to the platform a bid b r j for acquiring accurate sensing data. The worker w i ∈ W charges the platform b w i if she is recruited to perform all the sensing tasks in T i . We use two vectors, denoted by b
. . b w m }, to represent the bids of all requesters and the charges of all workers, respectively, where b w i ≥ 0 and b r j > 0 for any w i ∈ W and any t j ∈ T . Requesters and workers need to report their bids and charges to the platform, respectively, before an MCS campaign launches. We assume that these bids and charges both remain unchanged after they are reported to the platform. Additionally, the platform pays nothing to the workers who are not recruited, and it charges nothing from the requester if her task cannot be executed.
In practice, MCS workers often perform sensing tasks in a probabilistic way. In other words, any individual worker cannot assure requesters of accurate sensing results, because some uncertain events (e.g., occasional data uploading failures, data noise, and uncontrollable activities of worker) will impact the quality of sensing data. In this paper, we consider parameter p ij as a measure for the data quality of worker w i performing sensing task t j . Obviously we have p ij = 0 if t j / ∈ T i or w i / ∈ W j . We assume that the P set, including the positive p ij values for all workers and tasks, are foreknown to the platform. In general, the platform can evaluate the p ij terms according to workers' spatiotemporal coverage, their historical contributions, or their reputation scores [13] , [17] , [19] - [21] . The platform usually recruits multiple workers and asks them to simultaneously perform a common task; with doing so, the platform can return aggregated sensing data to requesters, offering them higher-quality sensing service and then earning more profits. Formally, the aggregated data quality that a set of worker can provide to a task is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Aggregated Data Quality): If a worker subset W ⊆ W j is selected to perform a task t j ∈ T , the aggregated data quality achieved by W is written as
Recall that the requester of task t j pays b r j to the platform if she is offered the data of 100% accuracy. On the other hand, the requester would like not to pay for inaccurate data in her full bid [14] , that is, her actual payment is in line with the quality of the data she received. Such a payment style is called quality-based payment which is formally given as follows.
Definition 2 (Quality-based Payment): If the platform assigns sensing task t j to a worker subset W ⊆ W j and the aggregated data quality of W is j (W ), then the requester of task t j is willing to pay j (W ) × b r j to the platform, instead of her full bid b r j .
FIGURE 2.
Illustration of a simple case where there are three workers, and each of them, w i , can perform the sensing task t j with a probability of p ij . Here, b w i represents the charge of worker w i , and b r j , the bid for task t j .
As show in Fig. 2 , for instance, if worker w 1 executes task t j with a data quality of 0.3, then the requester for t j pays the platform $30, instead of her full bid, $100. If workers w 1 and w 2 collectively execute t j , the aggregated data quality is VOLUME 6, 2018 (1−(1−0.3)×(1−0.8)) = 0.86, and then the platform is paid with $86 by the requester of t j . We assume that the platform has to pay each selected worker as much as she charges. We next define the platform profit.
Definition 3 (Platform Profit): Consider an MCS campaign parameterized by W, T , P, b r , and b w . The platform profit can be formulated as f (W ) = g(W ) − h(W ), where subset W ⊆ W is the set of workers chosen by the platform, and g(W ) and h(W ) are given in (2) and (3), respectively.
Obviously, function g(W ) represents the total income of platform, which is paid by all the requesters whose tasks can be completed with a non-zero aggregated data quality; function h(W ) represents the total cost that the platform needs to pay the workers of W for their sensing data. In this paper, we assume that there always exists a worker w i ∈ W such that we have t j ∈T i b r j p ij > b w i . This assumption assures that we can always make a decision that leads to a positive platform profit.
Definition 4 (Marginal Platform Profit): Given a subset W ⊂ W, if we add one more worker w into W , then the platform profit equals f (W ∪ {w}). We denote by ν(w|W ) the marginal platform profit on W , which is achieved by adding worker w into W .
(4) The marginal platform profit (marginal profit, in short) measures the variation of the platform profit with one more worker included. In the example of Fig. 2 , taking into account the worker charges, we have f ({w 1 }) = $10 and f ({w 1 , w 2 }) = 86 − (20 + 40) = $26, and then we know ν(w 2 |{w 1 }) = $16. For our MCS model, obviously,f (∅) = 0. If function f (·) is non-decreasing, then it is easy to know that the marginal profit from adding extra worker is always non-negative. Yet this is not true all the time in our model: the extra revenue coming with recruiting one more worker may be less than the extra cost paid to that worker. In Fig. 2 , for example, the marginal profit of w 3 on {w 1 , w 2 } equals (17.4 − 26) = $-8.6.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND ANALYSES
In this subsection, we first formally define the PPM problem and then, demonstrate the computational challenge of determining optimal PPM solutions by a proof of NP-hardness. Finally, we analyze the submodularity and the non-monotonicity of general PPM problem, both of which collectively guide our designs of solving the PPM problem. 
As proven later in this subsection, the general PPM problem is a submodular maximization problem with a cardinality constraint [22] - [24] . Moreover, the numeric results in Fig. 3 hints at the non-monotonicity of the general PPM problem, which is essentially caused by the probabilistic collaboration among workers and the quality-based payment in MCS; in other words, with more and more workers included, the platform profit cannot always remain increasing, though. The non-monotonicity property poses a big challenge to solve the PPM problem with polynomial time, because typical greedy or local search-based approaches are likely trapped by local optima during their sequential searches [25] , [26] if the combinatorial searching space is large. The possible non-monotonicity of f (·), combined with the capacity constraint of platform, is a crucial roadblock to maximizing the platform profit in general PPM problem. Next we prove that the PPM problem is NP-hard, even without considering its non-monotonicity. The NP-hardness of PPM indicates the computational intractability [27] , i.e., the optimal solution for general PPM problem cannot be found in polynomial time unless P=NP.
Theorem 1: Generally the PPM problem is NP-hard. Proof: We prove this theorem by constructing a special case of the PPM problem and analyzing the NP-hardness of that case. We assume that for any given worker w i ∈ W and task t j ∈ T i , the sensing quality of w i performing t j (i.e., p ij ) is always equal to one. Such an assumption indicates that for any sensing task, we only need to allocate it to a single worker, without the help of probabilistic collaboration or data aggregation. In this case, therefore, the requester publishing task t j pays the platform in her full bid b r j . Additionally, we assume that all the requesters announce identical positive bid for their sensing task and that each worker of W charges nothing, i.e., the platform does not need to pay the workers for a cent. Clearly, the more sensing tasks the platform accepts and executes, the higher the platform profit will be in this special PPM case.
For the case constructed above, the optimization objective is naturally transformed into selecting at most κ workers such that the number of sensing tasks performed by the platform can be maximized. Formally, we in this special case aim at determining max W :|W |≤κ | w i ∈W T i |, where W ⊆ W. Now, it can be easily found that in essential, the mentionedabove special case of the PPM problem is a Max-k-Coverage problem [28] , which proves to be NP-hard. Hence we can conclude that the general PPM problem is at least NP-hard.
Lemma 1: In the PPM problem, g(W ) for W ⊆ W is a nondecreasing submodular function on the domain of 2 W .
The proof of Lemma 1 goes to Appendix A. The submodularity of g(W ) ensures that for any A, B ⊆ W, we always have [29] , [30] . In combinatorial optimization, a set function z : 2 E → R is said to be monotone if and only if z(A) ≤ z(B) is true for any two subsets A ⊆ B ⊆ E; in other words, continual inclusion of elements of E will never decrease the z-value.
Lemma 2:
The modularity of function h(W ) for W ⊆ W in Lemma 2 is proven in Appendix B. Although the objective function f (·) of PPM is likely rendered non-monotone under our MCS scenario, it is always submodular as shown by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: In the general PPM problem, f (W ) for W ⊆ W is a submodular set function defined on the domain of 2 W .
Proof: Suppose there are two subsets A, B ⊆ W. By the definition of function f (·) and the submodularity of function g(·), we have
Moreover, we know
, by Lemma 2. Thus we have (8), which shows the submodularity of function f (·).
The case studies shown in Fig. 3 and later in Fig. 6 indicate the existence of non-monotonicity in f (W ) for W ∈ 2 W . An extreme situation is one in which each worker charges nothing, i.e., b w i = 0 for any worker w i ∈ W. In such a case, f (W ) must be monotone. For monotone submodular maximization problems, the monotonicity of the objective function is very helpful in proving the approximation ratio of the corresponding greedy algorithms [24] , [31] , because the monotone property essentially implies that the marginal profit in sequential iterations is always nonnegative, even though it continually diminishes. In non-monotone cases, however, the marginal platform profit fluctuates or even becomes negative; thus, it is not straightforward to design a polynomial approximation algorithm with a provable competitive ratio. On the other hand, handling the challenge caused by the nonmonotonicity of PPM problem would shed a light on making more platform profit in general MCS campaigns.
III. DESIGNS
To enable the MCS platform to make more profit, we in this section present three algorithms: MaxG, RandG, and RandCom. Here we would like to emphasize that the design of RandG is the core contribution of this paper.
A. OVERVIEW
MaxG is a completely greedy algorithm for the PPM problem, which iteratively selects workers and always selects the worker with the highest marginal profit in each iteration. In this paper, MaxG also serves as a baseline for evaluating RandG. Similar with MaxG, algorithm RandG also applies an iterative greedy framework; but we embed a randomization policy into the greedy criterion of RandG. Such a randomization-embedded greedy policy aims to opportunistically avoid falling into the local optima that are caused by the non-monotonicity of PPM. We resort to a smallscale concrete example of MCS campaign to demonstrate the basic procedure of RandG and its potential advantage over MaxG. Besides, we analyze the asymptotic time complexity of RandG, and particularly, the performance guarantee that RandG can achieve in expectation. It is clear that if the objective function f (·) of PPM is monotone, MaxG has an advantage over RandG in terms of platform profit. For the non-monotone situation, however, RandG can achieve higher platform profit in many cases, as shown by later experimental results.
In the last part of this section, we discuss some issues of implementing RandG in practice, and propose the RandCom algorithm for general PPM problems. RandCom simply combines MaxG and RandG and takes the maximum one of the solutions of both algorithms. Given a real-life MCS campaign, therefore, the organizer can just run RandCom to make as high platform profit as possible, without needing exponentially-asymptotic time to examine whether the corresponding PPM instance is monotone or not.
B. DESCRIPTION OF ALGORITHMS
Both MaxG and RandG apply an identical iterative greedy framework to solve PPM problem, and they are different merely in the greedy criterion of selecting workers. So we first elaborate the RandG algorithm, leaving MaxG briefly described in Subsection III-C.
Before RandG runs, we assume that its inputs are foreknown: the set T of sensing tasks, the set W of workers, VOLUME 6, 2018
Go to line 23
Sort C in the decreasing order such that for any two pairs c i and c j , we have that c i is ahead of c j in the sorted
Uniformly choose one pair from C κ i at random, and denote it by (w, ν)
the set P of data probabilities, the vector of all requesters' bids, the vector of all workers' charges, and the constraint κ of platform capacity. In the RandG algorithm described below, we assume that κ is less than or equal to m 2 (m is the number of currently available workers), and we remove this assumption later in Subsection III-E.1. Algorithm RandG involves three parts: initializing several sets, performing iterations over those sets, and returning the final solution to platform. Before entering iterations, RandG initializes two sets and a collection. More specifically, we set W 0 with the input worker set W, and set S 0 with an empty set, meaning that none of workers is selected before the iteration starts. The collection S is used to maintain all the subsets of W that are determined in following iterations.
The main body of algorithm RandG works in an iterative way, and it employs four major stages in each iteration i for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ. In stage I, RandG calculates the marginal profit for each available worker of W i−1 (line 7) and stores in C all the pairs of worker and her marginal profit value. In stage II, RandG determines the top-κ pairs (workers) in terms of their marginal profit and puts them in set C κ i (lines 14 and 15). Since we assume κ ≤ m 2 , we know that there are at least m 2 workers remained in W i−1 after iteration (i − 1) is finished, indicating that we can always pick out κ workers from W i−1 in each iteration before the outer for-loop finally terminates. In stage III, RandG randomly chooses one worker w from C κ i such that its marginal profit is not less than the average marginal profit achieved by those top-κ workers (lines 16 and 18). In stage IV, RandG first inserts w, selected above, into the intermediate worker set S i for iteration i, while deleting w from the available worker set W i−1 ; second, RandG puts S i into collection S, declaring that a possible solution has been determined and recorded in the current iteration. It is noticeable that in line 11, we can stop the outer for-loop if no worker has positive marginal profit-because any subsequent iteration is unlikely to bring positive contribution to increasing the platform profit. In order to shrink the effect of non-monotonicity on RandG's performance, we do not consider S κ (determined in the last iteration) as the final PPM solution. As shown in line 23, we instead return some worker set of S that maximizes the platform profit.
The proposed algorithm RandG incorporates randomization into its heuristic-based greedy framework that selects the workers of maximizing the marginal platform profit. As shown by the greedy policy of RandG, the top-κ workers are reckoned to be more beneficial for platform profit maximization than other available workers are. In other words, the workers of the optimal solution for the PPM problem are very likely to be covered by the top-κ set determined in each iteration. A natural question comes here: why does RandG not directly select the worker with the highest marginal profit in each iteration? The answer actually is the motivation that we employ randomization in RandG. Recall that perhaps the objective function of PPM is non-monotone; and greedy or local search-based approaches are easy to run into local optima, if the optimization objective is a non-monotone function over a large searching space. Therefore, we embed into RandG a randomization policy of selecting workers, aimed at pursuing the opportunity of skipping over the local optima. One intuitive policy is to randomly choose one from the top-κ workers in each iteration. However, a shortcoming of such a randomization is that it might degrade the performance as to a single run, though it affects little on the expected performance. To further improve the performance of RandG, therefore, we place a restriction to the randomized worker selection: randomly selecting a worker in each iteration only from the subset C κ i ⊂ C κ i . With doing so, we aim to strike a balance in avoiding the local optima and the performance degradation of the single-run solution for PPM, as shown by later experimental results. 78564 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 4. A small-scale MCS case with randomly-generated setup, where circles represent workers and squares represent sensing tasks. The numbers below task and above worker are the full bid and the charge, respectively. The p ij term denotes the data quality of worker w i performing task t j .
C. EXAMPLES
We take a small-scale MCS case to well demonstrate the execution of the RandG algorithm and the motivation of the randomization policy incorporated into RandG. Its setup is shown in Fig. 4 . This case involves three tasks and six workers, and κ is set to three, that is, we can pick out at most three workers to perform these tasks. Before demonstrating the execution of RandG in this MCS case, we briefly introduce MaxG, which also serves as a baseline algorithm for evaluating RandG. MaxG is identical to RandG except for the criterion of selecting worker in each iteration. Without any randomization policy included, MaxG simply ''cherrypicks'' the worker with the highest marginal profit in each iteration, until all the marginal profits are negative. We next apply RandG and MaxG to the case given in Fig. 4 , and show their step-by-step procedures. Fig. 5 shows one possible walk-through of RandG, which exactly involves three iterations because κ is set to three. At the beginning, no workers are selected (i.e., S 0 = ∅) and consequently, the platform profit f (S 0 ) is zero. In the first iteration, RandG calculates the marginal profit of each available worker. For example, worker w 1 leads to a marginal profit (denoted by ν 1 ) of 24.25. Among all these workers, w 4 , w 2 , and w 3 outrank other workers in terms of marginal profits; that is, C 3 1 = {w 4 , w 2 , w 3 }. By line 16 of RandG, we calculate the average of all the three top-3 marginal profits and obtain ν 1 = 56.99. We find that in this iteration, the marginal profits of w 2 and w 4 are both greater thanν 1 , which leads to C 3 1 = {w 2 , w 4 }. We need to randomly choose one from C 3 1 as the first worker, who is thought of being promising to achieve as high platform profit as possible. Assume here that we randomly choose worker w 2 , even thought its marginal profit is 62.43, less than that of w 4 . We construct S 1 which is the union of S 0 and {w 2 }, while deleting {w 2 } from W 0 and setting W 1 with the updated W 0 . Next we insert S 1 into S, the collection of the subsets involving potential workers. Clearly, the first iteration terminates with the platform profit of f (S 1 ) = 62.43.
1) WALK-THROUGH OF RandG
In the second iteration, RandG begins its work still by calculating the marginal profit of each available worker (only five workers are left in this iteration). Here, the marginal profit of worker w 1 is determined by calculating f (S 1 ∪ {w 1 }) − f (S 1 ), and then it is equal to 12.84. Similarly we have the marginal profits of other four workers. In the second iteration, the top-3 workers are w 3 , w 4 , and w 1 , and their average marginal profitν 2 is equal to 15.58. We remove w 4 and w 1 because their marginal profits are less thanν 2 , which leads to C 3 2 = {w 3 }. Now the lucky worker is w 3 ; we then have S 2 = S 1 ∪ {w 3 } and the platform profit of the second iteration is f (S 2 ) = 82.92. Before the termination of this iteration, we insert S 2 into S. It is worth noting that in this iteration, the marginal profits of workers w 5 and w 6 are both negative, which can also imply the non-monotonicity of PPM's objective function.
In the last iteration (not demonstrated in Fig. 5 ), each available worker in {w 1 , w 4 , w 5 , w 6 } cannot lead to positive marginal profit, which makes RandG stop its outer for-loop with S 1 and S 2 determined. Until now, we complete selecting workers such that the number of these workers is not beyond three, and we have S = {S 1 , S 2 }. The final task (line 23) of RandG is to determine which element (worker set) of S contributes the most. In this example, we have f (S 2 ) > f (S 1 ), and thus, we consider S 2 = {w 2 , w 3 } as the final PPM solution. According to Fig. 4 , we know that the two workers of S 2 collectively perform all the three tasks, which produces the platform profit of f (S 2 ) = 82.92. 
2) WALK-THROUGH OF MaxG
Fig . 6 shows the walk-through of MaxG, which is deterministic and also involves at most three iterations. In the first iteration of MaxG, each of the six workers has the same marginal profit as her counterpart in the first iteration of RandG. According to the greedy criterion, MaxG chooses w 4 in this iteration without hesitation, because w 4 provides the maximum marginal profit; and then it constructs S 1 = {w 4 }. In the second iteration, MaxG chooses worker w 3 because it achieves the maximum among all the evaluations of f (S 1 ∪ {w i }) − f (S 1 ) for w i ∈ W 1 . After the second iteration terminates, MaxG produces a partial solution of S 2 = {w 4 , w 3 } with f (S 2 ) = 81.62. At the beginning of the third iteration (not demonstrated in Fig. 6 ), MaxG calculates the marginal profits of all the four available workers, trying to recruit one more worker to further increase the platform profit. But it only finds that each of the four available workers makes a negative contribution to the platform. At last, therefore, MaxG terminates all its work and returns S 2 as its final solution, which brings less profit to the platform than the solution of RandG does.
Actually, the optimal solution for the PPM instance shown in Fig. 4 is {w 2 , w 3 } (we obtained it by brute-force enumeration). By the above comparison of execution procedure between the two algorithms, we claim that RandG might work better than MaxG if both of them run on a common case: for a non-monotone PPM, selecting the worker with maximum marginal profit in each iteration cannot always yield a higher platform profit than the randomizationincorporated greedy policy of RandG does.
D. ALGORITHM ANALYSES
To demonstrate the efficiency and the performance of the proposed RandG algorithm, we first show its polynomial time cost and then, its expected competitiveness (also known as approximation ratio). Since MaxG does not evaluate top-κ workers in each iteration, it consumes less time than RandG; so we only analyze the time cost of RandG in this paper.
Theorem 3: For any 1 ≤ κ ≤ m 2 , algorithm RandG terminates with the time complexity at most O(nm 3 ).
Proof: It is easy to know that algorithm RandG can always terminate after a finite number of operations on the input sets and vectors; and then we only need to prove the polynomial time cost of RandG. We next analyze the time cost for each stage involved in any iteration i for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ.
For the foreach loop starting in line 6, RandG needs to calculate the marginal profit for each available worker of W i−1 . At the beginning of iteration i for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, there are (m − i + 1) available workers in W i−1 , and consequently, the calculation of all the marginal profits needs to invoke the f -oracle |W i−1 | times. Here, f -oracle represents the calculation of the objective function on a given worker set. Specifically, the f -oracle for a given worker w j ∈ W i−1 is invoked on worker set union S i−1 ∪ {w j }. According to Definition 3, we know that for a given worker w j ∈ W i−1 , the f -oracle takes O(|S i−1 ∪ {w j }|) = O(i) time to calculate the total charge of the workers of S i−1 ∪ {w j }, and O(n|S i−1 ∪ {w j }|) = O(ni) time, to calculate the actual payment from all n requesters. In iteration i, therefore, the foreach loop asymptotically takes
To determine the top-κ workers, we need to sort set C. In iteration i, there are (m − i) pairs in C, so the time cost for determining the top-κ workers is asymptotically O((m − i) log(m − i)), which actually is the time cost for carrying out the sorting process on set C. In line 16, the time of obtaining the average marginal profit is always O(κ) for any iteration. In addition, for any iteration, each set operation listed from line 18 to line 21 is constant in time cost. Now we know that for the i-th iteration, the total time cost is equal to We give two support lemmas and necessary notations before proving the expected approximation ratio of RandG. These two lemmas are briefly mentioned in [24] and [32] . In order to make this paper easy to follow, however, we will give clearer and more careful proofs for both lemmas. We denote by S * ⊆ W the optimal solution for the PPM problem. In addition, we denote by W (p) a subset of nonempty set W , where each worker w i of W is randomly added into W (p) with the probability p i ≤ p. We use function ν i (S) to represent the marginal profit obtained by adding w i ∈ W\S into S, i.e., ν i (S) = f (S ∪ {w i }) − f (S).
Lemma 3: In the PPM problem with a given p(0 < p < 1) and a non-empty worker set W , we have:
The proof of Lemma 3 goes to Appendix C. As a straightforward application of the submodularity concept, Lemma 3 implies the process of randomly selecting workers and shows the lower bound for the expected f -value achieved by the workers selected at random. Moreover, according to the proof of Lemma 3, it is not difficult to find Lemma 3 true for any submodular function. Clearly, term W (p) is not only a subset randomly determined but also an iterative random process as to the worker selection over W . Only by Lemma 3, however, it is still hard to analyze the approximation ratio of RandG. In the following, we give Lemma 4, which is proven in Appendix D. Lemma 4 provides a means of connecting the partial solutions of RandG with the optimal solution. represents the partial solution determined by RandG right after the i-th iteration.
Lemma 4: After the i-th
Theorem 4: Given a submodular function z : 2 E → R, for ∀A ⊆ B ⊆ E, it is true [31] :
Theorem 4 is one of multiple equivalent definitions of submodularity; it uncovers that the total extra profits on subset A is not greater than the sum of the marginal profits achieved by mutually adding elements of B\A into A. Based on the above lemmas and Theorem 4, we prove that algorithm RandG can in expectation achieve an approximation ratio of constant factor.
Theorem 5: In expectation, algorithm RandG returns a PPM solution with an asymptotic approximation ratio of 1 e , regardless of whether the objective function f (·) is monotone or not.
Proof: We first examine the expected marginal profit that comes from including any worker of C κ i in the i-th iteration. Since C κ i includes the top-κ workers as to marginal profit and S * includes at most κ workers, we have
. In the form of expectation, we therefore have
It is easy to know S * \S i−1 = (S * ∪ S i−1 )\S i−1 , as shown in Fig. 7 , and by Theorem 4 and taking an expectation on all possible S i−1 , we then obtain
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4. Next we focus on evaluating the expected platform profit, E[f (S i )], by the following deduction.
If we recursively apply (12) on E[f (S i−1 )], we can remove the expression of E[f (S i−1 )] at the right side of (12) and finally have
Since RandG recruits κ(κ ≥ 1) workers at most, evaluating (13) with i = κ leads to
Denote byS the solution returned by RandG in line 23, that is,S = arg
Thus, algorithm RandG in expectation achieves an asymptotic approximation with a constant factor of 1 e .
E. EXTENSIONS 1) REMOVING THE ASSUMPTION OF κ ≤ m 2
In the description of RandG and the aforementioned analyses, we assume that the capacity constraint of platform, κ, is not greater than m 2 , where m is the number of workers or the cardinality of worker set W. In practice, however, κ could be any positive integer that is not beyond m. For the case with κ > m 2 , fortunately, we only need little modification on the input to algorithm RandG such that its performance guarantee can still hold.
We assume that m is an even number and m 2 < κ ≤ m. We set κ 0 to (m − κ); apparently, we have κ 0 < m 2 . Before algorithm RandG enters the i-th iteration for i ≤ κ 0 , we can always pick out the top-κ workers from the available worker set W i−1 , because there are at least (m − i) workers in W i−1 and (m − i) ≥ (m − κ 0 ) = κ. However, algorithm RandG cannot work smoothly after it steps into the i-th iteration for i > κ 0 , because it does not have enough available workers to determine the top-κ workers (i.e., |W i−1 | < κ).
To address the above trouble caused by κ > m 2 , we modify the worker set W to be input to algorithm RandG-adding κ extra dummy workers into W; that is, the extended worker set W involves (m + κ) workers. With doing so, RandG can then work correctly with any κ ≤ m because κ is always less than or equal to m+κ 2 for κ ≤ m. More specifically, for any dummy worker w d of the extended W, its contribution of marginal profit is always set to zero in line 7 of RandG. Such a specification assures that the inclusion of dummy workers in the final solution RandG cannot have impact on RandG's performance. Also, it is easy to know that these dummy workers cannot affect the theoretical performance guarantee and the asymptotic time complexity of RandG, even though they may be involved in RandG's solution.
Actually, if any dummy workers are selected in the course of the RandG algorithm, they can be safely dropped from the returned worker set, without changing the f -value.
2) A COMBINED ALGORITHM FOR GENERAL PPM
For a real-life PPM instance, if its objective function f (·) is non-monotone, then the MaxG algorithm could miss the higher platform profit the moment it stops on the first local optimum. Attempting to opportunistically skip over the incompetent optima, we thus adopt a randomization policy in RandG to select the ''best'' worker in each iteration. In RandG, we restrict the range of random worker selection to the top-κ work set; and our randomization policy is able to guarantee an approximate solution of constant factor. Nevertheless, in a single run of RandG on a given PPM instance, it is still possible for this randomization policy to run into local optima or even to result in worse performance than MaxG does. For a single MCS campaign and the corresponding PPM instance, one preferable approach to improving the actual performance of RandG is to repeat it multiple times on this given PPM instance, and then we can take the best possible solution as the final solution. Recall that running RandG once needs at most O(nm 3 ) time. Repetitive operations of RandG on a given case will not significantly increase the asymptotic time cost, i.e., repeating RandG constant times leaves the total asymptotic time complexity unchanged. When the objective function of the PPM problem is nonmonotone, repetitive execution of RandG is very likely a step-up from MaxG in a single MCS campaign, as shown in our experiments. Comparing the greedy policies of RandG and MaxG, we can easily find that MaxG is more efficient in computational cost than RandG, because MaxG does not have to determine the top-κ workers in each iteration. Denote by I PPM the PPM instance corresponding to any single MCS campaign. We can surely obtain a better approximate solution by running both RandG and MaxG on I PPM . The more effective algorithm, called RandCom, is shown in Algorithm 2, which combines MaxG and RandG and takes the maximum one of the two solutions returned by MaxG and RandG. More specifically, we first run MaxG only once on I PPM to achieve a solution (denoted by S 0 ); second, we repeat running RandG r times on I PPM and pick out the best one (denoted by S 1 ) from all the repetitive solutions; finally, we select the better one from S 0 and S 1 as the solution for this given I PPM . Obviously, RandCom is at least 1 e in approximation ratio, even though we do not know what the approximation ratio of MaxG is. For practical account, the larger r is, the better the performance of RandCom is. Since the computational time cost of MaxG is lower than that of RandG, the time complexity of RandCom depends on its for-loop of invoking RandG. It is easy to know that the asymptotic time complexity of RandCom is also O(nm 3 ) unless r tends to be infinity.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive numeric experiments to validate our designs. We first introduce the methodology of conducting our experiments, and then analyze the experimental results.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To comprehensively analyze the performance of our designs, we conducted experiments under a set of cases with different system parameters. In each case, given worker w i , we randomly put a sensing task into T i ; besides, we set a limit on the size of any T i : each worker can execute at least 5 but at most 10 tasks. Setting an upper bound on |T i | is reasonable in practice because of workers' limited on-phone sensors and moving region. Additionally, the number of tasks that any worker can execute was randomly chosen within [5, 10] . Furthermore, we assigned a probability p ij for each pair of worker w i and task t j ∈ T i , which serves as the data quality of worker w i performing task t j . In all experiments, we randomly setp ≤ p ij < 1, wherep is the lower bound for any p ij and also a system parameter. The bid of each requester was a real number randomly chosen from [10, 100] ; the charge b w i of worker w i was proportional to the average data quality that it can provide, i.e., b w i = c 0 ×
p ij , where c 0 was set to 100. Such a way of setting worker's charge reflects that more capable worker should be paid more money once she is chosen by the platform. Table 1 shows the setups for the four different cases in our evaluation. These four cases examined how and to what extent a single system parameter under different algorithms affects the platform profit. We consider algorithm Rand-κ as a baseline in evaluation. Rand-κ uniformly selects κ workers at random, and then calculates the platform profit according to Definition 3. Rand-κ requires the lowest computational cost in comparison with algorithms RandG and MaxG.
B. RESULTS AND ANALYSES 1) PREVIEWING THE RUN-TIME BEHAVIORS OF RandG AND MaxG
Before showing the overall performance of our designs in the four cases, we turn to Fig. 8 to demonstrate the basic characteristics of the proposed RandG and MaxG in running. We ran both of them on a common PPM instance of small scale, and repeated running RandG only ten times. Fig. 8 plots the variations of the intermediate, normalized platform profits over the iterative processes of the two algorithms. Recall that both RandG and MaxG stop their iterations when the marginal profits of their currently available workers are all negative. It can be seen that the counts of iteration needed by RandG are different from repetition to repetition. For instance, the first run of RandG terminated with seven iterations, while the fourth run of RandG, with nine iterations. It is worth noticing that for RandG, the platform profit often varies non-monotonically, as shown by the fourth and the ninth runs of RandG. Such a non-monotone variation of platform profit necessitates line 23 of RandG. Comparing the performances of MaxG and RandG in Fig. 8 , we can observe that in earlier iterations of both algorithms, MaxG almost always outperforms each run of RandG. However, the randomized greedy policy of RandG shows strength in several repetitive experiments. Especially, the ninth run of RandG achieves better performance than MaxG doesincreasing the platform profit of MaxG by 14%.
2) COMPARING THE AVERAGE PERFORMANCES
We conducted extensive experiments with the setups shown in Table 1 , aimed at showing the overall performance of our designs under different cases. Since RandCom combines MaxG and RandG, we can simultaneously obtain the results of MaxG and RandG after RandCom terminates. Hereafter we only show the results of MaxG and RandG. In each experiment of RandCom under all the four cases, r was set to 100, i.e., RandG was repeated 100 times in each run of RandCom. For a given PPM instance, we ran RandCom and Rand-κ once and 100 times, respectively; the average result of Rand-κ is reported. Fig. 9 shows the average platform profits of the three algorithms under different cases, and Fig. 10 shows the average numbers of the workers who were finally chosen by MaxG and RandG in each case. Noticeably, Rand-κ always selected exactly κ workers, and then we omit its evaluation in Fig. 10 . In case 1, where 40 workers were involved and κ was set to 20, the platform profits achieved by the three algorithms continually increase, as the number of sensing tasks increases from 40 to 200. In case 1, RandG performs better than MaxG does, when the number of tasks is not beyond 160. With the number of tasks increasing, less workers can collaboratively perform a task, on average; and consequently, the difference in marginal profit between workers will possibly decrease. So, RandG has no clear advantage over MaxG, when there are 200 sensing asks to be allocated by the platform.
In Fig. 10 , we can see that in case 1, the platform capacity is not fully saturated (i.e., the number of workers finally chosen by RandG or MaxG is less than κ), when not too many tasks are processed by the platform. For instance, the platform can obtain considerable profit by recruiting around 12 workers to execute 40 tasks. Such a behavior indicates the nonmonotonicity of the general PPM problem.
For case 2 shown in Fig. 9 , Rand-κ almost does not change when the number of available workers varies; however, both RandG and MaxG slowly grow up in platform profit, as the number of available workers increases. More workers could bring more opportunities for the platform to find out the cost-lower workers who can provide higher data quality, and as we know, higher-quality service surely leads to more returns. This can be also seen in the evaluation of case 3 in Fig. 9 , where even Rand-κ can also improve its performance with higher-quality workers involved. In case 4 shown in Fig. 9 , 40 workers participated in each experiment and were expected to provide data to 80 sensing tasks. By the experiments under case 4, we examined the effect of κ (i.e., the constraint to the platform capacity) on the overall performance. The increase of κ always indicates that the platform can recruit more workers to accomplish an MCS campaign. When κ changes from 5 up to 15, the platform profits of all the three algorithms significantly rise up. When κ is set to 20 or larger, each of them hardly can further improve their profits. In the experiments of case 4, the number of tasks was fixed, and then there was a cap on the total payment from the requesters. Consequently, an excess of workers may push additional cost (charge) to the platform but it can no longer enhance the platform profit.
3) COMPARING THE PERFORMANCES IN A SINGLE MCS CAMPAIGN
On average, Fig. 9 plots the overall performances of RandG and MaxG, in which the performance of RandG in a single MCS campaign is hidden. To disclose the potential of the VOLUME 6, 2018 randomized greedy policy of RandG, we examined each repetitive experiment in all the four cases, and then we can evaluate the increase of platform profit that RandG can achieve in comparison with MaxG. Fig. 11 only plots a part of our results for the clarity of illustration.
From the 100 repetitions in case 1 shown in Fig. 11 , it can be seen that in most cases, RandG outperforms MaxG in a single experiment if the number of tasks is 40. In one experiment, compared with MaxG, RandG increases the platform profit by 8%. RandG cannot defeat MaxG in all cases, which suggests the necessity of applying the combined algorithm in Algorithm 2 in real-life scenarios. Although the improvement made by RandG fluctuates with 200 tasks involved in experiments, RandG outputs better solutions than MaxG does, in a half of repetitions. In the repetitive experiments of case 2, we can see that more workers bring higher increase of platform profit to RandG. In the 100 repetitions in case 3, it is clear that RandG is far better than MaxG in most cases, when the data qualities are overall larger (i.e.,p = 0.8). Withp set to 0.2, the total revenue of platform from requesters reduces, and then the marginal profit of worker will surely reduce, too, which in turn narrows the advantage of RandG over MaxG. In case 4 of Fig. 11 , the experimental results with 40 workers and 80 tasks are plotted. Noticeably, RandG almost outperforms MaxG all the time, when κ is small (i.e., 5) with respect to the number of available workers. When κ is set to 25, RandG hardly keeps on top of MaxG in most repetitive experiments, because a larger value of κ brings to both algorithms a larger searching space over a given 2 W , which will possibly make two of them face more local optima. Combining the experimental results under the four cases shown in Fig. 11 , we believe that RandG would contribute much to RandCom in the following MCS scenarios: not to many requesters relative to |W| (the number of available workers) are involved, the processing capacity of platform κ is significantly lower than |W|, and the overall data qualities are relatively high.
V. RELATED WORK
Recently the researchers have developed various incentive approaches for MCS or participatory sensing. Their operations are all to determine which workers and tasks should be included in an MCS campaign, while their objectives can be roughly categorized into two broad types: attracting and retaining high-quality workers (mobilephone users), and maximizing the social welfare or the platform utility.
Lee and Hoh [33] earlier employ an economic model to attract a desirable number of active workers in participatory sensing such that an adequate level of service quality with lowest incentive cost can be achieved. Huangfu et al. [34] propose an algorithm to foster and stimulate the cooperation among mobilephone users in opportunistic network application, by modeling and handling their selfishness. Wen et al. [14] propose an incentive mechanism, in which the payment to workers is determined according to their data quality. The authors also prove that their algorithm is trustful, individual rational, and social-welfare optimal. Kawajiri et al. [35] design Steered Crowdsensing, which aims at improving the data quality by incentivizing mobile users with the help of location-based services. A differentially private incentive mechanism is proposed in [36] ; this design is based on the single-minded reverse combinatorial auction such that the bid information of the workers cannot be disclosed. Hajiesmaili et al. [37] present an approach to incentivizing mobile devices to achieve device-to-device load balancing with minimum social cost. Chakeri and Jaimes [38] argue that the incentive mechanisms based on game or auction unreasonably assume the complete information on workers' behaviors; and then they come up with an iterative game framework, which can achieve equilibrium even with incomplete bidding information.
The platform is the bridge between requesters and workers and then is the core component in MCS campaign. Recent effort has focused on the maximization issues on the platform side. The work in [39] considers an MCS scenario where workers are incentivized to label binary sensing tasks under budget constraint, and the authors present an approach to increasing the platform utility with polynomial computation cost. But their platform utility is defined as a KullbackLeibler divergence, which measures the difference between the probability distributions of labels, rather than the actual profit that the platform can earn. Yang et al. [40] propose a platform-centric model which is also based on some utility function, and they use Stackelberg game to maximize the platform utility. Extending the work in [40] , Zhang et al. [41] design TBA to maximize the platform utility in MCS in an online way. CENTURION [17] is a double auction-based algorithm; it stimulates both requesters and workers to participate into MCS campaign, in order to maximize the social welfare of the platform, which jointly measures the satisfaction of requester and worker. Instead of maximizing the platform utility, Han and Zhu [18] maximizes the platform profit, as pursued in this paper. They present a stochastic Lyapunov algorithm, which can dynamically optimizes the platform profit under two constraints (the system stability and the participation time of worker). However, their algorithm is specially designed for mobilephone-based opportunistic sensing and does not consider the probabilistic collaboration usually needed by MCS campaigns.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the rapid growth of sensor-equipped mobilephone usage, MCS has become a promising means of urban sensing. MCS has been used in the industry and research projects that are interested in collecting data over a larger scope of area with lower costs. This paper centers on the platform profit maximization (PPM) in MCS applications with the probabilistic collaboration among workers and the capacity constraint of platform. Effective solution for the PPM problem matters a great deal to the businesses that operate MCS platforms for the profit-making purpose. We have formulated the PPM problem with the submodular maximization, proved its NP-hardness, and revealed the existence of nonmonotonicity in its objective function. We then have proposed three approximation algorithms, RandG, MaxG, and RandCom. Among them, RandG, which is designed to overcome the non-monotonicity of PPM, is the key contribution of this study. With a randomization policy applied to the greedy criterion for worker selection, RandG can in expectation achieve an approximation ratio of 1 e . As shown by the experimental results, RandG yields higher platform profit in most cases than MaxG does. Compared to the trivially random algorithm Rand-κ, RandG can increase the platform profit by 20∼50% with less workers. Simply combining RandG and MaxG, the RandCom algorithm is easy to deploy in real-life MCS applications; its platform profit yield is at least equivalent to the better one achieved by either of RandG and MaxG. In the future, we will extend our study and design effective algorithms for the PPM problem in online MCS scenarios where requesters and collaborative workers arrive online in a nondeterministic order. 
Similarly, we can evaluate g(B∪{w k })−g(B) as we do in (17) , and then we obtain 
Combining (17) and (18), we know that for any A ⊂ B ⊆ W and any w k ∈ W\A, the following inequality is always true.
The above inequality reveals the property of diminishing returns, which indicates that g(·) qualifies as a nondecreasing submodular function on the domain of 2 W .
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: Consider any two subsets A and B of W.
We only need to prove h(A) + h(B) = h(A ∪ B) + h(A ∩ B).
Since we have h(∅) = 0, it is easy to know this lemma holds true if A∩B = ∅. Furthermore, in the case of A∩B = ∅, we can apply the inclusion-exclusion principle to prove the correctness of this lemma, because function h(·) only sums up real numbers, as shown in (3).
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: To create W (p), we can examine the workers of W step by step, and randomly put each worker w i into W (p) with probability p i . Let W i = {w 1 , w 2 . . . w i } where 0 ≤ i ≤ |W |; then W i involves the workers who have been examined before the (i + 1)-th step. Obviously, W 0 = ∅. f (W (p)) can then be evaluated as
where ν i (W i−1 ∩W (p)) represents the marginal profit obtained at step i by including worker w i into W (p), and it is expressed with (20) . (20) If worker w i is not included into W (p) at step i, then we treat ν i (W i−1 ∩ W (p)) to be zero. Thus, the expected f -value of W (p) can be evaluated as follows. 
D. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: Consider iteration i of RandG; its partial solutions, S i−1 and S i , are shown in Fig. 7 . As we know, in each iteration, the probability that a worker is not picked up is equal to (1− 1 κ ) at least. After i iterations, therefore, the probability that a worker of W is always dropped by RandG is at least (1− 1 κ ) i . In other words, in iteration i of RandG, a worker of W i−1 is selected and added into S i−1 with a probability of at mostp = 1 − (1 − 1 κ ) i . If S i = ∅ (i.e., i = 0), then this lemma holds true obviously. Next we consider the union set S i ∪ S * (S i = ∅) and evaluate its expected f -value. Define a ''proxy'' function π (S) = f (S ∪ S * ) where S ∈ W. It is easy to prove that π (S) is also submodular. We can reformulate f (S ∪ S * ) as f ((S\S * ) ∪ S * ) without changing the f -value, which is easy to understand with the help of Fig. 7 . Consequently, we have π (S) = π (S\S * ). Next we evaluate π (S i \S * ) in RandG.
With the assumption that S * is known a priori, moreover, the determination of S i can be seen as an iterative random process W (p) where W = 1≤j≤i C κ j \S * and W (p) = S i \S * . In other words, before iteration (i + 1) starts, (i − |S i \S * |) workers are successively selected from W with probability at mostp. Applying Lemma 3 to function π (S i \S * ), therefore, we have
By the definition of function π (S) described above, we have E[f (S i ∪ S 
